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Huidekoper.



SOME IMPORTANT COLONIAL MILITARY OPERATIONS.

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THE SIEGES OF LOUISBOURG IN 1745 AND 1758

Address delivered before the
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COLUMBIA

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Thursday, February 12th, 1914.

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THE SIEGE OF LOUISBOURG IN 1745.

By the Peace of Utrecht, signed on April 11, 1713, France ceded to England Newfoundland, Nova Scotia (Acadia) and the Hudson Bay Territory, in other words all of Acadia with the exception of the little island of Cape Breton on which was situated Louisbourg. The conflict known as "Queen Anne's War" (1702-1713) was thus brought to a close and Sieur Antoine Crozat was unable to take advantage of the grant made him in 1712 of the entire commerce for 15 years of all the "king's lands in North America lying between New France on the north, Carolina on the east and New Mexico on the west, down to the gulf of Florida; by the name of Louisiana,"—which shows the enormous extent of the territory over which Louis XIV pretended to exercise suzerainty. The struggle for dominion in North America resulted in a renewal of hostilities in 1744 that lasted until 1748, known as "King George's War," which was in reality part of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). When Frederick the Great began the second Silesian War in 1744 by invading Bohemia and capturing Prague he started the blaze in the western hemisphere, to which both the French and the English colonists seemed only too ready to add their quota of fuel. It is unnecessary to enter here into the causes which spurred them on. Suffice to say the underlying reason was the realization that either England or France must eventually control North America and, in a lesser degree, the failure of the Peace of Utrecht to settle the question of boundaries between the rival Powers, a question which grew more acute with each ensuing year. An added factor lay in the fact that France had realized that the possession of Cape Breton Island was the key to the retention of Canada and had accordingly constructed a fortress of the first rank. The bay, known as *Havre-aux-Anglais*, was chosen as the site of a new city which grew rapidly in population by the concourse of French from Newfoundland and Acadians from Nova Scotia until it became a place of great importance. As Parkman aptly says:¹


"Louisbourg was a standing menace to all the Northern British colonies. It was the only French naval station on the continent, and was such a haunt of privateers that it was called the American Dunkirk. It commanded the chief entrance of Canada, and threatened to ruin the fisheries, which were nearly as vital to New England as was the fur-trade to New France. The French government had spent twenty-five years in fortifying it, and the cost of its powerful defenses—constructed after the system of Vauban—was reckoned at thirty million livres."

¹A Half a Century of Conflict, II, p. 83.

In 1744 the works were still uncompleted, although they were so formidable in character as to be practically impregnable, and it was believed that, despite their unfinished state, any adequate garrison could hold them for an indefinite period against any force that could be brought against them.

The news of the outbreak of war reached Louisbourg some weeks before that fact was known in the British colonies and Duquesnel, the French Military Governor, thought that he was afforded a capital opportunity to strike a blow for the profit of France which would also inure to his own honor. The fishing station of Canseau, situated on the strait of Canseau which separates the Acadian peninsula from Cape Breton or *Isle Royale*, proved the tempting bait and early in May Captain Duvivier was despatched to seize it with 600 soldiers and sailors, escorted by two small armed vessels. The English promptly surrendered and were sent to Boston as agreed, and the wretched hamlet and its wooden citadel burned to the ground. Duquesnel then addressed himself to the capture of Annapolis—formerly known as *Port Royal*—then held by about 100 men under Major Mascarene, and a small reinforcement of militia sent by Governor Shirley of Massachusetts. In August Duvivier appeared before Annapolis but, after three weeks of desultory attacks and the failure of two ships which he had expected to arrive from Louisbourg, two ships did appear from Boston with 50 Indian Rangers destined for Mascarene. This completed the discomfiture of Duvivier and at the end of September he decamped. The effect of his unsuccessful attempt was much more far-reaching than he or Duquesnel had bargained for. New England, alarmed and exasperated at the attacks on Canseau and Annapolis, became a tinder-box and out of the fire thus engendered rose a project which, on sober reflection, seems little short of the phantasmagoria of madmen. It was nothing less than the capture of Louisbourg, “reputed the strongest fortress, French or British, in North America, with the possible exception of Quebec, which owed its chief strength to nature, and not to art.”¹ This was the place that William Vaughan of Damariscotta strongly urged Governor Shirley to attack with a paltry force of 1,500 New England militia. On January 9, 1745, Shirley submitted this crazy proposal to the General Court of Massachusetts at a meeting sworn to secrecy, but it was rejected. The question then came up before the Assembly and, thanks to Vaughan’s efforts, was accepted by a majority of one. It would be superfluous to enter here into the details which led to the organization of this madcap expedition. Suffice to say that Shirley’s efforts to enlist aid from the

¹Parkman, II, p. 83.



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1. Princess Bastion.
2. Hospital.
3. Queen's Bastion.
4. Recollets' Parish Church.

5. The King's Bastion and Barracks.
6. Royal Storehouse.
7. Governor's Houses.
8. Bakehouses.

VIEW OF LOUISBOURG IN 1731.

9. Billiard Room.
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13. Battery and Islet at Entrance.
14. Lighthouse.
15. Rochefort Point.
16. Pond.

From a sketch by Verrier in the Paris archives.

17. Fish Stages.
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19. Black Point.



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various colonies met with but small success and that eventually the force was composed as follows:

Massachusetts contributed.....	3,300 men
Connecticut.....	516
New Hampshire.....	454
	<hr/>
	4,270 men ¹

Shirley's choice for command fell upon William Pepperrell, the son of a Welsh trader, who had become the chief merchant in New England, had risen to the rank of colonel commanding the Maine militia, and was a member of the Governor's Council—for Maine was then still part of Massachusetts. About all that could be said in his behalf was that he enjoyed unusual popularity and "as little military incompetency as anybody else who could be had."² He was commissioned Lieutenant-General and Capt. Edward Tyng selected to command the flotilla composed of the *Massachusetts*, *Caesar*, *Shirley*, *Boston Packet*, *The Tartar* and 6 sloops. On March 24, 1745, the fleet consisting of about 90 transports, escorted by the provincial cruisers, sailed from Nantasket Roads as Admiral Peter Warren, then at Antigua with a small squadron, had found himself obliged to decline to accompany the expedition. Luckily, 3 days after refusing Shirley's request, Warren received a letter from the Duke of Newcastle ordering him to sail for Boston and to concert with Shirley "for the annoyance of the enemy and His Majesty's service in North America."³ Before reaching Boston Warren learned that Pepperrell had sailed and accordingly shaped his course for Canseau, the *rendezvous*. There he found a motley aggregation and, if he knew of it, must have heartily agreed with the caustic remark of Dr. Douglas of Boston that "the expedition has a lawyer for contriver, a merchant for general, farmers, fishermen and mechanics for soldiers." He might have added officers utterly devoid of experience and discipline remarkable for its total absence as was the case with the cannon, the heaviest being only 22-pounders. It was refreshing to hear men propose to get guns by capturing the detached work called the Grand or Royal Battery which contained thirty heavy pieces which, as Hutchinson tartly remarked, was "like selling the skin of the bear before catching him," even although there was considerable knowledge of the fortress which had been supplied by the militia captured at Canseau.

¹Rhode Island disbanded her force of 150 men but raised them again too late to participate in the siege.

²Parkman, II, p. 99.

³Memoirs of the Principal Transactions of the Last War, p. 46.

On Friday, April 5th, 69 craft had reached Canseau after having been much buffeted about by a heavy gale. It was not until the 23d that Commodore Warren appeared with the *Superbe*, 60 guns, the *Launceston* and *Mermaid* of 40 guns each, and in the meantime news had been received that the bay of Louisburg was blocked with ice, and a French frigate the *Renommée*, 36 guns, was chased by the provincial cruisers and prevented from delivering despatches to the Governor of Louisbourg. On Friday the 27th it was learned that Gabarus Bay was free of ice and two days later the flotilla sailed from Canseau, expecting to reach its destination at 9 p. m. in order to carry out Governor Shirley's receipt to take Louisbourg "while the enemy were asleep."¹ An unexpected calm upset their plans and it was not until morning of April 30th that the buildings of the "Dunkirk of America" hove in sight. What they saw tended to encourage their demented illusions, for the buildings were insignificant and the ramparts, low-lying and massive, totally belied the strength of the position.

"The extreme southeastern boundary of the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence is marked out by the island of Cape Breton. Huge promontories, beetling cliffs, massive indentations and broken reefs mark the bold shore and make the rocky coast line among the most dangerous in the world. On the south side of the island there is a deep and splendid haven upon the edge of which now nestles a dilapidated fishing village. On the peninsula which juts out toward the east and which, with a continuing line of reefs ending in a rocky islet, encloses the spacious harbor, are the grass-covered mouldering remains of one of the greatest fortresses of the world."²

"Across the base of the peninsula referred to as extending between sea and harbor, had been built a line of works about 1,200 yards in length. The *glacis* sloped gently up from a vast marsh which prevented approach from the landward side. Between it and the walls lay a ditch 80 feet wide and 36 feet deep. On the opposite side of this moat a huge rampart of earth from 40 to 60 feet thick, rose to a height varying between 30 and 40 feet. It was faced with masonry, defended by three formidable bastions, and surmounted at intervals by cavaliers, or super-imposed works further to enfilade the wall. The bastions were known as the King's (the citadel) in the centre and the Queen's and Dauphin's at either end. The wall was carried around the seaward and landward edges of the peninsula, enclosing a wide triangle, the apex of which was finished by another huge bastion called the bastion Maurepas, after the famous prime minister of Louis XV. Beyond this bastion stretched an unprotected piece of low ground used as a cemetery, which gradually narrowed

¹Journal of Major General Walcott.

²Cyrus Townsend Brady, *Colonial Fights and Fighters*, p. 165.

into a barrier of rocky and impassible reefs forming an excellent break-water, extending across the bay and terminating in a huge rock upon which was erected a powerful battery of thirty heavy guns. This formidable work which commanded the entrance to the harbor, which was about a half mile wide, was called the Island Battery. Commanding the entrance from the inner shore of the bay another fort had been erected, called the Grand or Royal Battery, which mounted 28 French 36-pounders (equivalent to an English 42), and 2 long eighteens. Thus an enemy's vessel attempting to enter the harbor would be subjected to direct fire from the Island and an enfilading fire from the Grand Battery.

"The main works of the town were pierced with 148 embrasures, though but 90 guns, many of them of large calibre including several mortars were mounted therein. There were a few breaks in the wall toward the sea where there was no access by land, and an approach for ships so difficult as to be practically impossible. Even here, however, temporary works afforded sufficient protection. Opposite the Island Battery a tower of lofty proportions from whose summit a fire blazed nightly, indicated to approaching vessels the entrance to the harbor. Access to the town from the land was had at the northwest corner of the base wall, over a causeway and bridge which was protected by a circular battery of 18 cannon covered by the Dauphin bastion.

"The various works were garrisoned by 8 companies of regular soldiers, three of which were Swiss mercenaries.¹ The force was supported by some 1,400 Canadian militia. In quality the defenders were deficient. The commandant, Chevalier Duchambon"—the successor of Duquesnel who had died in the autumn²—"and his second were irresolute and vacillating, the troops unpaid and badly treated. They had been compelled to work on the fortifications without extra compensation, their regular pay was long in arrears, and official peculation, the curse of New France, had deprived them of their legitimate perquisites and comforts. A short time before the investment they had broken out in open mutiny and had been persuaded to return to their duties with the greatest difficulty. The spirit of the peasants, traders and other inhabitants was not much better. The folly of France in allowing such conditions to obtain in the place upon which so much had been lavished, and which was deemed of such importance, is apparent. Aside from the fortifications and harbor, the place had little value; the inhabitants were poor and their dwellings mean."³

¹"The garrison consisted of 560 regular troops, of whom several companies were Swiss, besides some 1,300 or 1,400 militia—*Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg* who declares that 300 or 400 more might have been had from Niganiche and its neighborhood had they been summoned in time. The English reports just after the siege places the number of militia at 1,310.—*Parson, Life of Pepperrell*, p. 103.

²Parkman, II, p. 114.

³Brady, pp. 166-168.

Duchambon expected an attack but, as the *Habitant de Louisbourg* declares,¹ "we lost precious moments in useless deliberations and resolutions no sooner made than broken. Nothing to the purpose was done, so that we were as much taken by surprise as if the enemy had pounced upon us unawares."

Despite this criminal negligence on the part of the French, one cannot refrain from a smile at the taterdemalion force with a flag on which was inscribed the words *Nil desperandum Christo duce* attempting to reduce this stronghold. The audacity of their project was almost incredible and it was nothing but the crusading spirit of this motley crew which was stimulated to the utmost by a "goodly company of preachers" that lifted the undertaking above the level of the rankest *opera bouffe*.


Allusion has already been made to the arrival of the fleet near Louisbourg on Saturday morning, April 30, 1745. Its course was shaped toward Flat Point which projects into Gabarus Bay,² three miles west of the town. Duchambon promptly sent Morpain, a captain of a privateer or "corsair," to oppose the landing with 80 men who were to be reinforced by 40 more already on the watch near the supposed point of disembarkation. Cannon were fired and alarm bells rung in Louisbourg to summon the militia in the neighborhood.

Pepperrell made a feint toward Flat Rock but recalled his boats and Morpain was deceived into thinking that his apparition had frightened them off. Pepperrell augmented his force by several other boats and a race ensued between his party of 100 men and Morpain for Fresh-Water Cove, or *Anse de la Cormorandière*, 2 miles farther up Gabarus Bay. The Colonials beat the French and, despite the rocks and heavy surf, got ashore ahead of Morpain's arrival, killed 6 men and captured 6, and put the rest to flight, with a loss of only two. The French tamely made no further opposition, and that night 2,000 men were put ashore; followed by about 2,000 more who landed at their leisure next day. Luckily the weather was unusually mild and fine, for the troops were without cover of any sort and bivouacked on the ground.

On May 2nd Vaughan was detached with 400 men to reconnoitre the enemy's position and upon arriving near the town saluted it with three cheers. Continuing through the woods, he advanced to the Grand Battery on the northeast arm of the harbor and, through the incredible apathy of the French, his men were successful in setting fire to the extensive magazines of naval stores at that point. The enormous column

¹Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg contenant une Relation exacte & circonstanciée de la Prise de l'Isle-Royale par les Anglois. A Québec, chez Guillaume le Sincère, à l'Image de la Vérité, 1745. An extremely rare work.

²Sometimes called "*Chapeau Rouge*" Bay. It is a spacious outer harbor immediately adjoining Louisbourg.



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of smoke produced by the pitch, tar and other combustibles apprized Pepperrell of the success of his lieutenant.

Next morning, May 3rd, Vaughan reconnoitered the Grand or Royal Battery with a detachment of only 13 men but, discovering no signs of occupants and unable to believe their eyes, halted on the outskirts and bribed an Indian, by the proffer of a flask of whiskey, to enter the fort. The Indian, just drunk enough to be reckless, crawled into the battery and found that the French had deserted it, after spiking their guns. The rest of the party followed, and William Tufts, a boy of 18, climbed up the flagstaff and fastened his red coat at the top as a substitute for a British ensign, which drew a volley of cannon-shot from the town. Vaughan then despatched a messenger to Pepperrell with the following report:

“May it please your Honor to be informed that by the grace of God and the courage of 13 men, I entered the Royal Battery about 9 o'clock and am waiting for a reinforcement and a flag.”

Meanwhile, the French repented of their panic and sent 4 boat loads of men to re-occupy the fort. For some reason which is still unexplained, Vaughan did not take refuge within the battery but posted his detachment on the open beach, in the most exposed position that could have been taken, where they were subjected to the fire of the town and the island batteries. Notwithstanding this blunder, which might readily have proved suicidal, they managed to beat off the French boats and to hold their ground until Lieutenant-Colonel Bradstreet appeared with a reinforcement and compelled the French to abandon their attempt.

I have dwelt at considerable length on this episode insomuch as it was the one detail of Shirley's astounding plan that was successfully carried out, and, furthermore, it proved the determining event of the siege. The Colonists got possession of a number of heavy guns of the latest and most approved pattern and, thanks to the carelessness of Captain Thierry, the French officer commanding the battery, Major Seth Pomeroy, a gunsmith by trade, was able to extricate the files from the “*tuch holes*” without great difficulty. Moreover, a lot of munitions of war were found intact, including “*Sume Bums*” which the “*Bumaneers*” utilized to excellent effect next morning in the captured 42-pounders—of which there were 28—and the two 18-pounders. As the *Habitant de Louisbourg* narrates, “the enemy saluted us with our own cannon, and made a terrific fire, smashing everything within range.”

No censure can adequately condemn the French for abandoning the Grand or Royal Battery. As Parkman says:¹ “the water-front of the battery was impregnable. The rear defenses consisted of a loopholed

¹Vol. II, pp. 120-121.

wall of masonry, with a ditch 10 feet deep and 12 feet wide, and also a covered way and glacis" which "had been partly demolished with a view to reconstruction. The rear wall was flanked by two towers which, says Duchambon, were demolished; but General Wolcott declares that the swivels were still mounted on them and he adds that "two hundred men might hold the battery against 5,000 without cannon." The English landed their cannon near Flat Point; and before they could be turned against the Grand Battery, they must be dragged 4 miles over hills and rocks, through marshes and jungles of matted evergreens. This would have required a week or more. The alternative was an escalade, in which the undisciplined assailants would no doubt have met a bloody rebuff. Thus this Grand Battery, which, says Wolcott, "is in fact a fort,"¹ might at least have held long enough to save the munitions and stores, and effectually disable the cannon which supplied the English with the only artillery they had, competent to the work before them. The hasty abandonment of this important post was not only Duchambon's only blunder, but it was the worst of them all."

The situation of the besiegers was scarcely better than the besieged. There were no tents, the ground was soaked, thatched huts had to be improvised, shoes and clothing failed, many boats were lost in landing *matériel*, the troops were so ignorant in the use of guns that Commodore Warren had to send experienced gunners ashore to give instruction. As the approaches to the fortress were well-nigh impassible, Lieutenant-Colonel Meserve, who happened to be a carpenter, improvised great flat sledges upon which the cannon were secured and dragged by 200 men with breast-straps a distance of more than 2 miles to Green Hill² where the first battery of 6 guns was located on a spur of the rugged heights which half encircle the town and harbor. This was accomplished in 4 days, and a week later a second battery of four 22-pounders and 10 coehorns was established 700 yards farther ahead and within easy reach of the citadel. Another battery, chiefly of coehorns, was planted on a hillock 440 yards from the West Gate and the following night an advance battery placed scarcely 250 yards from the gate. On May 20th, a fifth battery, called the Northwest or Titcomb's, was located on a hillock north of the *Barachois*, a salt pond formed by a projecting sand-spit, and proved more destructive. It must be borne in mind that all this work was done under fire from the fortress—and the French practice was excellent³—as well as under difficulties almost unsurmountable.

Meanwhile, on May 7th, eight days after landing, a summons to surrender was sent to Duchambon who retorted that he would answer with

¹Journal of Major General Wolcott.

²Facing the West Gate or *Porte Dauphine*.

³One soldier who in bravado mounted the rampart and stood there for a moment was shot dead with five bullets. The guns could only be loaded under a continuous fire of musketry.

his cannon. The following day he made a half-hearted sortie but was repulsed with small loss to either side. This was one of his few attempts, which was unquestionably due to his fear to use his mutinous troops outside the fortifications. On the 9th day of May a council of war "advised unanimously that the Town of Louisbourg be attacked by storm This Night" but fortunately another council convened that same day

"Advised, That, inasmuch as there appears a great Dissatisfaction in many of the officers and Soldiers at the designed attack of the Town by Storm This Night, the said Attack be deferred for the present."¹

Since 9 out of 10 men had no bayonets, many no shoes and the scaling ladders brought from Boston were 10 feet too short,² and since there was nothing approaching a breach in the walls and the French boasted that women alone could defend the fortification, it was well that this madcap project was not attempted with troops in such want and so devoid of experience or discipline.

During all this time the besiegers and defenders kept up a continuous fire against each other, but the latter appear to have suffered more than the former. Almost every house was rendered untenable, being either destroyed or set on fire, and the wretched inhabitants were forced to take refuge in the casemates where they dragged out a pitiful existence. Provisions became scarce and powder scarcer, and it was evident that the end could not long be postponed. Nearer and nearer crept the hostile batteries, but never a trench or parallel was opened, for the English colonists were ignorant of the proper method of investing a fortress. Yet Duchambon sat still, like a man in a trance, waiting for Fate to overwhelm him.

His adversaries were made of different stuff and the word "impossible" found no place in their dictionary. Having relinquished the plan of carrying the place by storm, it was subsequently decided to assault the Island battery which closed the harbor entrance to English ships while keeping it open to the French. How to find the two landing places to this formidable-work, which were narrow gaps between rocks lashed by almost constant surf, no one knew, but Vaughan assured Pepperrell that, if given command, he would send the French flag to headquarters in 48 hours. Whale-boats were mended and paddles made, but the bad weather forced several postponements until Warren grew impatient and offered to support the attack with 200 seamen. Finally, on May 23rd, volunteers were mustered at the Grand Battery but a bright moon and northern lights caused a further postponement which was doubtless lucky as the squads were "without officers, noisy, disorderly, and, in

¹Record of the Council of War, 9 May, 1745.

²Douglas, Summary, I, p. 347.

some cases, more or less drunk.”¹ On the 26th the night was dark and 300 men started about 12 o'clock in boats under the command of one Brooks whom they themselves had selected. They were joined by 150 from Gorham's regiment stationed at Lighthouse Point, but the wind rose and when they reached the island the surf was lashing the rocks with unwonted fury. Only three boats could approach at a time between the breakers but, none the less, a landing was effected without opposition. When only one-third of the attacking force had been drawn up on the beach, some drunken man proposed three cheers which awakened the French and the assailants were greeted with a withering fire from the 30 cannons, 7 swivels, 2 mortars and 180 infantry in the battery. An attempt was made to scale the ramparts and a desperate fire kept up until daylight when the boats were driven off and the shore party compelled to lay down its arms with a loss of 189, nearly half.²

The French were obviously much elated, and well they might be as this was their only success during the siege. Nothing daunted, Pepperrell resolved to reduce the Island battery by a work erected half a mile away on the eastern half of the harbor at Lighthouse Point. This involved carrying cannon and mortars in boats to the nearest landing-place on a rocky and almost inaccessible shore, hauling them up a steep cliff and dragging them $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles to the spot selected, but the task was accomplished and a deadly fire poured on the Island Battery which before long dismounted or destroyed its guns.

Meanwhile, on the 19th of May, the *Vigilant*, a 64-gun ship carrying 560 men and stores for the garrison, under the Marquis de la Maisonfort, appeared and after a hot fight with the British squadron was forced to strike her colors. The French were now plunged into despondency while the English were doubly encouraged as their prize produced large stores of ammunition and provisions of which they were in such dire need. The Lighthouse Battery continued to do such destructive work that Duchambon sent Sieur de Beaubassin with 100 men and 80 Indians to take the battery but they were defeated with heavy loss and driven back, their commander being severely wounded.

It was not all plain sailing for Pepperrell, as the Governor-General of Canada sent the noted partisan Marin with a body of 600 or 700 French and Indians to attack Annapolis where Mascarene kept them at bay until May 24th when they disappeared. The news soon leaked out that Duchambon had sent them orders to make all haste to the aid of Louisbourg and the besiegers, magnifying their strength four-fold, expected an attack by numbers in excess of their own. “This wrought a wholesome reform. Order was established in the camp, which was now fenced

¹Parkman, II, p. 137.

²*Ibid*, pp. 139-140.

with palisades and watched by sentinels and scouting-parties."¹ Moreover, differences arose between Pepperrell and Warren but were eventually smoothed over and the British Commodore, whose squadron had then been increased to 11 ships, proposed, now that the Island Battery was almost *hors de combat*, to enter the harbor while the army attempted to storm the town. The French, on the other hand, had made desperate efforts under cover of the night to repair the damage done by the relentless advance of the Colonists' batteries and the continual fire beneath which walls and bastions were fast crumbling. The West Gate was closed with a wall of stone and earth 20 feet thick; an epaulment made to protect what remained of the once formidable Circular Battery where 13 of the 16 guns had been dismounted; a cavalier—or raised battery—built on the King's Bastion which the English fire soon demolished; and 3 cannon planted against the advanced battery—or *Batterie de Francoeur*, as they called it—to take it in flank, but, as Duchambon narrates, the enemy "repaired by night the mischief we did them by day."²

When the French saw a large quantity of fascines carried to the foot of the *glacis* ready to fill the fosse and their scouts came in with reports that more than 1,000 scaling-ladders were concealed behind the ridge of the nearest hill, their spirit broke. The townspeople gave Duchambon to understand in no uncertain terms that they refused to be put to the sword and that they were not strong enough to resist a general assault,³ and on the 15th of June presented a petition to him begging him to capitulate.⁴ The English preparations were interrupted by the French drums beating a parley and La Perelle was sent with a flag of truce to ask a suspension of hostilities and time to submit proposals for surrender. Warren happened to be ashore at the time, and he and Pepperrell replied that Duchambon's overtures had come in good season to prevent the attack and gave the Governor until the following morning at 8 o'clock to bring forward his tenders. They were received in due time but were of such a nature that Pepperrell promptly rejected them and sent back Bonaventure with counter-proposals which were identical with those declined by Duchambon on May 7th, supplemented by other conditions, one of which was that no officer, soldier or inhabitant of Louisbourg should bear arms against the King of England or his allies for one year. The French Governor then stipulated, as a condition for his acceptance, that his troops should march out of the fortress with their arms and colors. To this both Warren and Pepperrell consented, the articles were signed on both sides and on June 17th the English fleet sailed into the

¹Parkman, II, pp. 145.

²Duchambon au Ministre, 2 Septembre, 1745.

³Bigot au Ministre, 1 Août, 1745.

⁴Duchambon au Ministre, 2 Septembre, 1745.

harbor while part of the ragged army entered the south gate and Pepperrell had the satisfaction of receiving the keys of the town in his own hands.¹ His troops expected unlimited plunder and were thoroughly disgruntled at finding but little booty and dire poverty, whereupon there arose, as one diarist records,² "A great Noys and hubbub amongst ye Solders a bout ye Plunder; Som Cursing, som a Swarein," which is not surprising in that motley horde where Rum, Puritanism and Religion went hand in hand.³

Thus fell one of the mightiest fortifications ever erected, capitulating to a motley band of farmers and fishermen, led by a lumber merchant. The news of the capture of Louisbourg, which reached Boston on July 3rd, set the colonies ablaze, while in England the tidings were received with astonishment and a joy diminished only by reflections on the strength and mettle of colonists supposed already to be aspiring to independence. Pepperrell was created a baronet, commissioned a colonel in the British army and given a regiment to be raised and maintained by the King—similar honors being given to Governor Shirley—and Warren was made an Admiral.⁴

The capture of Louisbourg is one of the most astounding feats in the annals of war, excelled perhaps only by Caesar's taking of Alesia.

"This colonial expedition was the maddest enterprise and the most impossible from a military point of view that was ever undertaken. That it succeeded was due to the combination of patient endurance, religious zeal and innate capacity of the New England men, seconded by the shrewdness and ability of Pepperrell, the hearty coöperation of Warren, and the culpable supineness and inefficiency of the garrison. Its importance to the future history of this country was not little. Many of the colonists learned how to fight in this campaign and the drums which rolled in triumph at the head of the hardy colonists as they strode through the sally port of Louisbourg were the same which beat the long roll on the slopes of Bunker Hill. When the New Englanders saw the mud walls Gage erected on Boston Neck and compared them to the mighty ramparts of Cape Breton, which they had so gallantly surmounted, they laughed them to scorn."⁵

¹Parkman, II, pp. 149, 150 and 157.

²Diary of a Soldier, anonymous.

³A zealot preacher named Moody set forth armed with an axe to destroy the idols worshipped by the French and incidentally to convert some of the defenders. When the colonists entered the town, he at once proceeded to the churches and demolished everything that offended his Puritanical standards. While he was preaching one Sunday in the garrison-chapel his colleagues were indulging in "excessive stealing in every part of the town," according to the *Journal of Major-General Wolcott*.

⁴Parkman, II, p. 158-159.

⁵Brady, *Colonial Fights and Fighters*, pp. 185-186.

In the following year France, roused at last to the effort that should have been made in 1745, sent a huge fleet under Admiral d'Anville, but the storm which greeted it in the Bay of Biscay was only the advanced-guard, as it were, of the unbroken series of disasters that made this expedition one of the most ignominious and ill-fated ever attempted by France.¹ Notwithstanding this complete *débauche*, the work of Pepperrell and Warren was undone by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (October, 1748) when Cape Breton and Louisbourg were given back to the French, "amid the loud protestations of the few in England who were conversant with the politics of the North Atlantic—protestations fully justified by the immense stress laid upon its restoration by the French."²

Once in possession again, France occupied the fortress with greatly augmented forces and so encouraged the efforts of the French priests and their "bloodthirsty battalions of so-called Indian converts * * * to promote discontent with British rule" that a counterpoise had to be created by the foundation of Halifax (July, 1749) "the only instance * * * of a British colony of free men founded by the Imperial Government for a definite and Imperial purpose."³ In 1756 war broke out again between France and England which was destined to settle once for all the supremacy of the rival Powers of this continent. The "French and Indian War" as it was termed by the American colonists, was but part and parcel of the Seven Years War in Europe, and in it Louisbourg played a rôle only second to Quebec. This time France was not to be caught napping; a million sterling had been spent on its fortifications under the supervision of Franquet, the eminent engineer. "From behind its two-mile circle of stone bastions and massive curtains of well-mortared masonry nearly 400 cannon frowned defiance upon all comers. Drucour was now governor, while about 4,000 men, mostly French or Canadian regulars, in addition to the same number of inhabitants, with a year's provisions,"⁴ supported by seven line-of-battle ships and five frigates, carrying 550 guns and 3,000 sailors, lay at anchor in the harbor to assist in the defense.

Against it England assembled a fleet of 200 ships and 12,000 men⁵ in Halifax and, on June 1st, 1758, this formidable array hove in sight of

¹*Ibid*, p. 185; Parkman, II, pp. 174-184.

²A. G. Bradley, *The Fight with France for North America*, p. 47.

³*Ibid*, p. 48.

⁴*Ibid*, p. 217.

⁵Lord "Amherst's army consisted of about 12,000 men, made up of the following corps: The 15th (Amherst's), 17th (Forbes'), 28th (Bragg's), 35th (Otway's), 40th (Hopson's), 47th (Lascelles'), 48th (Webb's), 58th (Anstruther's), the first and second battalions of the 60th or Royal Americans, and the 63rd (Fraser's Highlanders); there were also five companies of rangers and artillery, with about 140 guns of varying calibre."—*Ibid*, pp. 218-219.

“the Dunkirk of the North” with its mighty ramparts rising behind a white fringe of raging surf. It was not until June 7th that a landing was effected near Kennington Cove or *La Cormorandière*—where Pepperrell had disembarked 13 years before—led by three young officers, after the celebrated Wolfe—one of the most gallant soldiers in all history—had been temporarily repulsed. To trace this new siege in detail would be superfluous inasmuch as both army and fleet contained only one body of Colonial troops.¹ The principal dates and incidents of this campaign may be briefly summarized thus:

THE SECOND SIEGE OF LOUISBOURG.

1758.

February 19.—Admiral Boscawen—nicknamed “Old Dreadnought” and “Wrynecked Dick”—sailed from the Solent with Wolfe and part of the army.

May 10.—Admiral Boscawen and his fleet anchored in Halifax harbor.

A fortnight later Lord Amherst arrived with nearly 200 ships and 12,000 men.

June 2.—The French were surprised to see Gabarus Bay filled with 23 ships-of-the-line, 18 frigates and 116 transports. A heavy sea was running.

June 5.—The wind dropped slightly but gave way to fog.

June 6.—The wind and fog moderated and the troops were put into boats, but a rising wind compelled the abandonment of the attempt to land.

Evening of June 7.—The wind fell and the men were put into boats.

June 8.—The fleet continued its cannonade of the French fortifications Wolfe and his division pushed for Kennington Cove where 1,200 French soldiers and a strong battery were entrenched above the shore line and behind *abatis* of fallen trees. The heavy sea and hot fire of the French repulsed Wolfe, but three boats commanded by Lieutenants Hopkins and Brown and Ensign Grant effected a landing at a spot protected by the angle of the cliff from the fire of the French batteries. The rest of the boats followed and the French were driven back to Louisbourg with a loss of 100 on either side. Lord Amherst's camp leaned its left on the mouth of the stream where Pepperrell's camp had been situated, extending thence in a broad bow to a point one mile north of Green Hill. Block-houses were built at each extremity of the line. Beginning of operations bearing a marked resemblance to those of the colonists 13 years earlier.

¹The Royal Americans, better known as the 60th Rifles, were raised in the American colonies. These two battalions contained many German colonists and so many Swiss that German and Swiss officers had to be procured, including their colonel Bouquet, then in Pennsylvania with Forbes.

June 17.—The siege guns were brought ashore from the fleet. The French withdrew to the fortifications, destroying a battery of 30 guns on the opposite side of the harbor. Wolfe sent to place a battery at Lighthouse Point.

June 26.—The battery at Lighthouse Point was completed. The French Admiral Desgouttes sank four of his ships in the channel in order to protect the rest.

June 27.—The English began to push forward their batteries composed of 200 big guns and mortars.

July 6.—The French commander Drucour made a *sortie* against the British left but was easily repulsed.

July 9.—A second *sortie* of 1,000 men was made which forced the British grenadiers out of their trenches in the darkness. The Acadians and Indians commanded by Boisherbert, a noted partisan leader, attacked the left flank but were repulsed.

July 16.—Wolfe occupied Gallows Hill within 300 feet of the Dauphin's Bastion and erected a battery there.

July 21.—Three French ships—*Le Célèbre*, 76, *L'Entreprenant*, 64, and *Le Capricieux*, 64—were burned in the harbor by English shells.

July 22.—The residence of the Governor and other officials in the citadel was destroyed by fire.

July 26.—About 1 a. m. in the midst of a thick fog 500 sailors in boats with muffled oars stole into the harbor and captured *Le Prudent*, 74, and *Le Bienfaisant*, 64, the only two French ships left in the harbor, fired the former and brought out the latter.

July 26.—Less than 6 French guns were feebly replying to 107 heavy British pieces firing at close range and several breeches had been made in the wall of the fortress. De Drucour rejected Amherst's terms for instant and unconditional surrender, but so great was the pressure brought to bear upon him by the inhabitants that at midnight he signed the capitulation.

July 27.—In the morning General Whitmore marched in and took possession of the fortress.

Thus fell Louisbourg for the second time, capitulating after a siege far more desperate than the first. That same day the garrison was drawn up on parade before Whitmore and, with gestures of rage and mortification, laid down their arms and filed gloomily off to the ships which were to transport them to England. 5,637 prisoners, soldiers and sailors, were included in the capitulation, 240 serviceable guns taken together with a large amount of ammunition and stores.¹ The French

¹The second capture of Louisbourg was primarily due to the dashing audacity, sound judgment and brilliant military genius of James Wolfe. "He is mad," said one of the incapables of King George's *entourage* when he read of Wolfe's daring tactics and remarkable innovations. "Mad is he?" growled the old King, with a vivid memory of some of his cocked-hatted failures, "then I only hope he'll bite some of my generals!"

fleet was totally destroyed and the French power on the North Atlantic coast vanished like a wraith. The way lay clear to Quebec where the following year that "*preux chevalier*," Wolfe, laid down his life in the moment of victory on the Plains of Abraham (September 13, 1759) that England might hold undisputed sway over a mighty empire stretching from the Spanish territory on the Gulf of Mexico to the trackless wastes of everlasting ice that guard the Polar Sea.

As Halifax possessed a superior harbor and was better adapted to control the neighboring and friendly territory, and was already a town of importance, in 1760 an army of workmen was sent to demolish the fortifications at Louisbourg. For six months they labored and today you may stand, as I have done, and marvel how little can remain of the mightiest constructions of man.

"Green mounds and embankments of earth enclose the whole space, and beneath the highest of them yawn arches and caverns of ancient masonry. This grassy solitude was once the "Dunkirk of America;" the vaulted caverns where the sheep find shelter from the rain were casements where terrified women sought refuge from storms of shot and shell, and the shapeless green mounds were citadel, bastion, rampart and glacis. Here stood Louisbourg; and not all the efforts of its conquerors, nor all the havoc of succeeding times, have availed to efface it. Men in hundreds toiled for months with lever, spade and gunpowder in the work of destruction, and for more than a century it has served as a stone quarry; but the remains of its vast defenses still tell their tale of human valor and human woe."¹


"Today a collection of fishermen's huts by the shore is nearly all that is left of this great stronghold of French power in the days when a mighty colonial future lay within her grasp. Short by comparison as is the story of the New World, he would be a dull soul who could stand unmoved by that deserted, unvisited, surf-beaten shore, where you may still trace upon the turf the dim lines of once busy streets, and mark the green mounds which hide the remains of the great bastions of Louisbourg. It has not been given in modern times to many centres of note and power to enjoy within the short space of a century and a half at once such world-wide fame and such profound oblivion."²

In the burying-grounds near Rochefort and Black Points where hundreds of French, English and Colonial soldiers who fought in 1745 and 1758 sleep their last sleep, no tombstone, no cairn, no cross has been raised. The ground has never been blessed by a priest, forgotten are the dead and the war of creeds in which Catholics and Puritans struggled for supremacy over half a world. One monument alone commemorates the capture of Louisbourg, a simple shaft, erected in 1895 by the Society of Colonial Wars.

¹Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, II, pp. 52-53.

²Bradley, p. 230.

SIEGE OF LOUISBOURG, 1745.



Scale of Feet.



- A. Landing of Pepperrell's command.
- B. Camp of Burr's regiment.
- C. Camp of Pepperrell's regiment.
- D. Camp of Willard's regiment.
- E. Camp of Moulton's regiment.
- F. Camp of Moore's regiment.

- 1. First, or Green Hill, Battery.
- 2. Second Battery.
- 3. Third Battery.
- 4. Fourth, or Advance, Battery.
- 5. Fifth, or Titcomb's, Battery.
- 6. Lighthouse Battery.

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THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE FRENCH
AND ENGLISH FOR THE VALLEY OF
THE OHIO, 1749-1758

Address delivered before the

SOCIETY OF COLONIAL WARS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA

ON

Thursday, March 5th, 1914



THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH FOR THE VALLEY OF THE OHIO, 1749-1758.

I. THE FIRST FAILURE.

WASHINGTON'S EXPEDITION, 1753.

If France blundered often in her military operations in North America certainly no such charge can be laid at her door in respect to her choice of Governors-General or Viceroys of Canada. They were selected with utmost care and were nearly always either fighting men or statesmen, or both. Their position was that of a leader of a triumvirate, the other members being the Intendant—a person of legal requirement who supervised the finances and to some extent shared the government with his chief—and the Archbishop who guarded the interests of the powerful Church of Canada. To this triumvirate was joined in times of stress a military commander. In the middle of the XVIIIth Century Canada was ruled over by four men of remarkable ability, de la Galissionière (1747-1749), de la Jonquière (1749-1752), the Marquis Duquesne de Ménéval (1752-1755) and the Marquis de Vaudreuil (1755-1759). The first, a man of extraordinary insight, determined to secure unquestioned possession of the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi and, by joining Canada with Louisiana, cut the continent in two and hem the English in behind the barrier of the Alleghenies, as well as deter and intimidate all European interlopers. As Lodge very pertinently observes,¹ "In all the vast wilderness beyond the mountains there was not room for both French and English." In 1749 de la Galissionière sent his first expedition under Céleron de Bienville to take possession of the Ohio in the name of Louis XV. This expedition covered no less than 3,000 miles, pushing as far as the Great Kennawha (West Virginia), nailing sheets of tin with the arms of France to trees at various points, at the foot of which they buried plates of lead with suitable inscriptions "as a token of renewal of possession heretofore taken of the aforesaid River Ohio. * * *"² De Céleron also wrote a civil letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania "expressing surprise that the English should be making so free with territory that all the world knew was the property of

¹George Washington, I, p. 62, American Statesmen Series.

²The inscription on the plate buried at the confluence of the Ohio and Conewango on July 29, 1749, is given by *Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe*, I, p. 43.

his most Catholic Majesty.”¹ The English colonists knew almost nothing of this expedition and even their most far-sighted leaders scarcely noticed it, but, as a matter of fact, too much emphasis cannot be laid upon its importance geographically and politically, for on the part of the French it was the prologue of war.

In 1749 de la Jonquière succeeded de la Galissionière as the French Viceroy but was unable to accomplish much to advance their policy. At his death in 1752 the King sent the Marquis Duquesne de Ménéval who promptly set to work to drill the 2,000 regulars and 15,000 militia into an efficient force which he accomplished within two years. In 1752 he sent an expedition under Marin—who died and was succeeded by Legardeur de St. Pierre—to build forts on the site of the present city of Erie and at the head of the Ohio navigation, the latter called *Fort le Boeuf*. This impressed the Indians with ideas of the French determination and English apathy, but it also roused the British to a realization of their danger and caused them to demand explanations which precipitated the crisis.

Meanwhile, two land companies were formed in Pennsylvania and Virginia and had acquired grants in the disputed territory, but they soon fell to quarelling, the British officials did nothing to support them and no attention was paid to the warnings of the friendly Indians that the chain of forts being built by the French and the progress of their traders and soldiers from the North and the South would inevitably strangle the English settlements out of existence. The other Indian tribes obviously threw their lot with the French whose star seemed in the ascendant while the British fortunes appeared on the wane. Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia in alarm sent a commissioner to protest against these aggressions, but his envoy, Captain Trent, stopped 150 miles short of the French posts, frightened by the troublous conditions and by the defeat and slaughter which the French had visited upon the Indians who attempted to oppose their encroachments. As a more vigorous person was needed to warn France to desist from trespassing on the English wilderness, Dinwiddie selected the Adjutant General of the Northern Division, a major of 22 years, George Washington. Leaving Williamsburg on October 31, 1753, accompanied by van Braam, Christopher Gist—the boldest of the Virginia frontiersmen—with 7 white men and Indians they pushed from Will’s Creek (Cumberland, Maryland) on November 15, 1753, through Logstown to Venango on the Ohio, the first French outpost, commanded by Joncaire. At supper, the French officers, flushed with wine, declared that they intended to take the valley of the Ohio and “by God to keep it,” and made every effort to entice the Indians to leave Washington. He prevailed, however,

¹A. G. Bradley, *The Fight with France for North America*, p. 46.

and pushed on to Fort le Boeuf where he delivered Dinwiddie's demand,¹ sketched and learned as much as he could about the fort, and received Legardeur de St. Pierre's evasive reply² which was similar to Marshal

¹"Sir,

"The lands upon the River Ohio, in the Western Parts of the Colony of Virginia, are so notoriously known to be the property of the Crown of Great-Britain; that it is a matter of equal Concern and Surprize to me, to hear that a Body of French Forces are erecting Fortresses, and making Settlements upon that River, within his Majesty's Dominions.

"The many and repeated Complaints I have received of these Acts of Hostility, lay me under the Necessity, of sending, in the Name of the King my Master, the Bearer hereof, George Washington, Esq; one of the Adjutants-General of the forces of this Dominion; to complain to you of the Encroachments thus made, and of the Injuries done to the Subjects of Great-Britain, in open Violation of the Law of Nations and the Treaties now subsisting between the two Crowns.

"If these Facts are true, and you shall think fit to justify your Proceedings, I must desire you to acquaint me, by whose Authority and Instructions you have lately marched from Canada, with an armed Force; and invaded the King of Great-Britain's Territories, in the Manner complained of? that according to the Purport and Resolution of your Answer, I may act agreeably to the Commission I am honoured with, from the King my Master.

"However, Sir, in Obedience to my Instructions, it becomes my Duty to require your peaceable Departure; and that you would forbear prosecuting a Purpose so interruptive of the Harmony and good Understanding, which his Majesty is desirous to continue and cultivate with the most Christian King.

"I persuade myself you will receive and entertain Major Washington with the Candour and Politeness natural to your Nation; and it will give me the greatest Satisfaction, if you return him with an Answer suitable to my wishes for a very long and lasting Peace between us. I have the Honour to subscribe myself,

SIR, Your most obedient,
Humble Servant,

ROBERT DINWIDDIE."

Hulbert, Historic Highways, Vol. III, pp. 108-112.

²"Sir,

"As I have the Honour of commanding here in Chief, Mr. Washington delivered me the Letter which you wrote to the Commandant of the French Troops.

"I should have been glad that you had given him Orders, or that he had been inclined to proceed to Canada to see our General; to whom it better belongs than to me to set-forth the Evidence and Reality of the Rights of the King, my Master, upon the Lands situated along the River Ohio, and to contest the Pretensions of the King of Great-Britain thereto.

"I shall transmit your Letter to the Marquis Duguisne. His Answer will be a Law to me; and if he shall order me to communicate it to you, Sir, you may be assured I shall not fail to dispatch it to you forthwith.

"As to the Summons you send me to retire, I do not think myself obliged to obey it. What-ever may be your Instructions, I am here by Virtue of the Orders of my General; and I entreat you, Sir, not to doubt one Moment, but that I am determin'd to conform myself to them with all the Exactness and Resolution which can be expected from the best Officer.

"I don't know that in the Progress of this Campaign any Thing passed which can be reputed an Act of Hostility, or that is contrary to the Treaties, which subsist between the two Crowns; the Continuation whereof as much interests, and is as pleasing to us, as the English. Had you been pleased, Sir, to have descended to particularize the Facts which occasioned your Complaint, I should have had the Honour of answering you in the fullest, and, I am persuaded, most satisfactory Manner.

"I made it my particular Care to receive Mr. Washington, with a Distinction suitable to your Dignity, as well as his own Quality and great Merit. I flatter myself that he will do me this Justice before you, Sir; and that he will signify to you in the Manner I do myself, the profound Respect with which I am,

SIR,
Your most humble, and
most obedient Servant,

LEGARDEUR DE ST. PIERRE."

Hulbert, Historic Highways, Vol. III, pp. 115-117.

MacMahon's famous retort at Sevastapol, "*J'y suis, j'y reste.*" Retreating to Venango, another struggle for the savages ensued wherein rum, as usual, played the principal rôle. This time the chiefs determined to stay behind, but fortunately the important Half-King remained true to the English cause. Washington then placed the cavalcade under van Braam and pushed ahead with Gist, his progress beset with weather of unusual severity, tremendous snowstorms and hardships enough to tax the stoutest heart. The Indian who guided them, being in the pay of the French, led them astray and, seizing a favorable opportunity, fired point-blank at Washington. He was immediately pounced upon and would have been killed *instantly* by Gist had it not been for Washington's intercession. They did disarm him, however, and drive him away, kindled two delusive fires, doubled on their trail and thus escaped pursuit. After incredible hardships they reached the Ohio where they nearly lost their lives by the capsizing of an improvised raft. Frozen and starving they arrived at the hut of a trapper named Frazier, on the Monongahela River, where they stayed until January 1st, 1754. Sixteen miles farther, at Gist's house they separated and on January 16th Washington placed the French defiance in the hands of Governor Dinwiddie at Williamsburg.¹

II. THE FATE OF JUMONVILLE AND THE CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON AT FORT NECESSITY, 1754.

Meanwhile the Governor of Virginia had

"received permission from the English Government to oppose force by force, and to erect, on his part, forts upon the Ohio, at the expense of the colonial Governments. The officials of both nations were now committed to an armed occupation of the same country—a proceeding which could have but one result. But the French were ready with men and money, and strong in a united purpose. Dinwiddie, on the other hand, could do nothing with the colonial legislatures"²

which did little else but squabble and make excuses why they could not participate. At last New York and South Carolina placed two independent companies at the disposal of Dinwiddie, and his own legislature voted £10,000 for the defense of their frontier. Virginia's sole regiment consisted of 300 raw recruits, commanded by Colonel Fry, an Oxford M. A., with Washington as its Major. "With this formidable host the

¹The principal authorities for the above narrative are Major Washington's Journal of a tour over the Alleghany mountains, published shortly after his return to Williamsburg and quoted by Sparks, Writings of Washington, I, pp. 432-447. Manuscript Journal of Christopher Gist; Sparks, Writings of Washington, I, pp. 25-35 and 428-429; Dépêches de Duquesne; letter of Fraser in the Colonial Records of Pennsylvania; V, p. 659; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, pp. 20-25, 36-53, 60, 81-89 and 128-136; Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America, V, p. 492; Bradley, pp. 35-46; Brady, pp. 189-193.

²Bradley, p. 65.


PLAN OF
FORT LE QUESNE

Built by the
French.

At the Mouth of the
Ohio and Monongahela
in 1754.

The OHIO or HOHIO that is Fair River
The Ohio a rapid River near $\frac{1}{4}$ of a Mile wide

The Monongahela a slow river near a $\frac{1}{2}$ of a Mile wide
The Monongahela a slow river near a $\frac{1}{2}$ of a Mile wide



Explanation

- A A The ditch with a drawwork
- B D The earth not dug away in the Lunette
- C The Bastion and the Powder Room on which 4 pieces of Cannon are mounted
- D D Magazines
- E The draw bridge 12 feet
- F The Command room 18 by 32 feet
- G The guard room 18 by 32 feet
- H Soldiers barrack 18 by 32 feet
- I Storehouse 18 by 32 feet
- K Apartment for Officers 18 by 32 feet
- L A Smiths Shop 18 by 15 feet
- M A Prison
- N Quarters for the Cadets
- O A Kitchen 18 by 12 feet
- P The Powder Room
- with 1200 lbs 12 feet high with deep holes for fresh air
- Huts for Soldiers
- In the Fort are 3 Cannons
- Mounted 4 of them 3 Pounders

This Plan was sent from America as it had been taken by some French Deserters

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excellent Dinwiddie prepared to dispute with France, as best he could, the Empire of the West."¹

It was then the early spring of 1754. Forty backwoodsmen under Captain Trent—the envoy of the preceding year—Lieutenant Frazier and Ensign Ward were sent across the Alleghenies to erect a fort at the spot selected by Washington at the confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny, the site of the modern Pittsburgh. On April 2nd, Washington set out with two companies from Alexandria, leaving Colonel Fry to follow with the main body. Three weeks later, April 20th, he reached Will's Creek and was amazed to find Trent who had abandoned his command. To cap the climax, came the news that the French, 1,000 strong, under Le Contrecoeur, had swooped down on the fort, captured it and sent Ward and his men packing back to Will's Creek where they arrived on the 25th. While Fry remained at Will's Creek, Washington struck out across the mountains and through a desolate region, *en route* for the rude stockade just captured, which the French had demolished and supplanted by a formidable work named Fort Duquesne in honor of their commander. On May 9th Washington had arrived at Little Meadows, the 18th at the Youghiogheny River and the 27th at Great Meadows, apparently oblivious to his danger. Learning from his Indian allies that the French were on the march and had thrown out scouting parties, he selected a place for a fort in the Great Meadows, which he dubbed "a charming field for an encounter,"² sent out a scouting party and then, with only 40 men started to find the enemy for himself. After a toilsome march, he surprised the enemy in his camp on May 28th, and a few volleys ended the affair. Ten French were killed—including a young ensign, Coulon de Jumonville—23 wounded and only one escaped, while the Virginians lost only one killed and three wounded. As Lodge aptly remarks:³

"This little skirmish made a prodigious noise in its day, and was much heralded in France. The French declared that Jumonville, the leader, who fell at the first fire, was foully assassinated, and that he and his party were ambassadors and sacred characters. Paris rang with this fresh instance of British perfidy, and a M. Thomas celebrated the luckless Jumonville in a solemn epic in four books. French historians, relying on the account of the Canadian who escaped, adopted the same tone, and at a later day mourned over this black spot on Washington's character. The French view was simple nonsense. Jumonville and his party, as the papers found on Jumonville showed, were on a spying and scouting expedition.⁴ They were seeking to surprise the English when the English

¹Bradley, p. 66.

²Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, dated Great Meadows, 27 May, 1754. *Sparks*, II, p. 25.

³George Washington, I, pp. 72-73.

⁴These papers are quoted *in extenso* on pages 94-97 of the "Journal of Colonel George Washington, commanding a detachment of Virginia troops sent by Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, across the Allegheny Mountains, in 1754, to build forts at the head of the Ohio."

surprised them, with the usual backwoods result. The affair has a dramatic interest because it was the first blood shed in a great struggle, and was the beginning of a series of world-wide wars and social and political convulsions, which terminated more than half a century later on the plains of Waterloo. It gave immortality to an obscure French officer by linking his name with that of his opponent, and brought Washington for the moment before the eyes of the world, which little dreamed that this Virginian (*sic*) colonel was destined to be one of the principal figures in the great revolutionary drama to which the war then beginning was but the prologue."

Senator Lodge might have added that it was at the Great Meadows rather than at Lexington that was fired "the shot heard round the world."

Washington at once set to work to strengthen Fort Necessity, but by the middle of June Coulon de Villiers, Jumonville's brother, burning for revenge, had hastened from Canada with 1,000 Indians, and had joined Contrecoeur and his 1,400 men at Fort Duquesne, only 70 miles away. The death of Colonel Fry put Washington in command; he started to advance but, after covering only 13 miles, learned of the approach of the French and fell back to Fort Necessity, where his opponents appeared on July 3rd. Washington drew up his troops outside the fort and a lively skirmish ensued throughout the morning. In the afternoon the rain fell in torrents and, although the Colonials had taken to the fort, nearly 100 out of 350 were killed or wounded, the Indians deserted to the enemy, the fire of the French rendered the stockade untenable, the men were exhausted and the ammunition gone. One demand for surrender was refused but the second had to be accepted. The terms were honorable enough, *viz*: the garrison to march out with all the honors of war, carrying their effects and one swivel with them. The articles were reduced to writing by the French, brought back by Captain van Braam who translated them into English, and at midnight Washington and his officers appended their signatures in the darkness and rain, relieved only by the feeble light of a sputtering tallow dip. When it was all over, they discovered to their horror that they had unwittingly confessed themselves the murderers of Jumonville, for van Braam, in his meagre French, had rendered the phrase "*l'assassinat du Sieur de Jumonville*" as the "killing" or "death" of the young ensign. This episode was most unfortunate, for the French made great capital out of it in their subsequent discussions about the happenings in the valley of the Ohio and even Washington's indignant disavowals were unable to counteract the unfounded impression thus created in Europe.

On July 4th the fort was evacuated and the dejected defenders began their retreat of 70 miles to Will's Creek, hampered by the wounded who had to be carried on their backs and incessantly threatened by the Indians who killed all the horses and destroyed all the medicine-chests but were unable to bring on the fight they sought to provoke. At Will's Creek, Washington left the troops and rode on to Williamsburg to report

to Governor Dinwiddie that his first attempt to win the valley of the Ohio had proved a disastrous fiasco.¹

III. THE THIRD FAILURE: BRADDOCK'S EXPEDITION, 1755.

Dinwiddie's wrath fell, not upon Washington and the troops,² but upon the dilatory colonies which had failed to support him. But the damage had been done. "No English trader dare any longer cross the mountains. British prestige had vanished in the West, and the French were everywhere paramount; yet the colonists were still quarrelling briskly, both with one another and with their governors, concerning land grants and patents situated in this very country."³ The British Ambassador at Paris did protest to the Court of Versailles against the unjustifiable occupation of the Ohio valley but to no avail. In November, 1754, Parliament voted money to send troops to His Majesty's American plantations—but only for their defense—and before the end of January, 1755, the 44th and 48th regiments of the line had sailed from Cork Harbour. The French, who were very wide awake, retorted by sending 3,000 soldiers and a new Governor of Canada, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, from Brest early in May, while each Government mutually assured the other of its friendship and esteem. Admiral (after Lord) Howe captured two of the French fleet off Nova Scotia but the rest got safely into Louisbourg. France recalled her Ambassador at St. James in June but shrank from declaring war.

Meantime, on February 20th the British fleet cast anchor in Hampton Roads and General Edward Braddock proceeded to Williamsburg to confer with Dinwiddie. This officer, then over 60 years of age, has had little but obloquy heaped upon him by historians. Personally, I have never believed that every defeated general was necessarily an imbecile or a traitor. Of his bravery there can be no possible question. Of his faults one can say that they were characteristic of the men of his day and of many British leaders of every age—utter disregard for the opinions of those better informed than they being one of the most conspicuous. He was confronted with conditions utterly foreign to any he

¹The authorities for the above account are *Journal of Colonel Washington* (cited *supra* p. 25, footnote 4), pp. 1-165; *Sparks, Writings of Washington*, I. pp. 40-57, I, pp. 6-51, Appendix II, pp. 447-455, Appendix III, pp. 456-468; *Dinwiddie Papers*; *Letter of Contrecoeur in Mémoire contenant le Précis des Faits, avec leurs Pièces Justificatives, pour servir de Réponse aux Observations envoyées, par les Ministres d'Angleterre, dans les Cours de l'Europe*—the official French version; *Dussieux, Le Canada sous la Domination française*, p. 118; *Gaspé, Anciens Canadiens*, appendix, p. 396; *Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe*, I, pp. 136-161; *Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America*, V, pp. 493-494; *Winthrop Sargent, The History of an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne in 1755 under Major-General Edward Braddock*, pp. 40-54; *Bradley*, pp. 66-74; *Brady*, pp. 193-197.

²The Virginia Legislature passed a vote of thanks to Washington and his men, and expressed proper regret at their misfortunes.

³*Bradley*, p. 75.

had ever encountered and, unable to adapt himself to them, failed,¹ just as it is probable that any other British commander of that time would have failed.

Washington accepted the position of colonel on his staff and in the camp at Alexandria attended his only school of the soldier where he learned lessons of discipline and drill which later stood him in such good stead. On April 14th a council drew up the plan of campaign but it was not until May 20th that the entire force, consisting of about 2,000 men, assembled at Fort Cumberland, and not until June 7th that the advance was begun by Sir Peter Halkett with the 44th, followed next day by the provincials under Burton, and on the 10th by Dunbar with the 48th, Braddock and his staff bringing up the rear. An elaborate road had to be made and it was the 16th of June before they reached Little Meadows, barely 20 miles from Cumberland, the rate of march being only $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles *per diem*. On the 19th, Braddock, heeding Washington's advice, pressed forward with 1,200 regulars and 200 of the best provincials, leaving Dunbar to follow with 600, the weaker horses and the sick, including Washington who was ill with fever. Ninety miles then intervened between the army and Fort Duquesne, and the rate was increased to between 5 and 6 miles per day. To the soldiers in leather leggings, tight woolen coats of bright scarlet, loaded down with heavy knapsacks and tall mitred hats, the heat and fatigue were well-nigh unsupportable. Washington complained that "instead of pushing on with vigor, without regarding a little rough road, they were halting to level every mole-hill, and to erect bridges over every brook"² and, as one sarcastic writer avers,³

"Not a single practice of a European march was omitted, no point of military procedure was slighted. It might take them years to reach the valley of the Ohio, but they would do it as trained soldiers should. They set a fine example to the forest trees, since there was nothing else to see them."

On July 3rd,⁴ Braddock, who cheerfully shared every hardship, even surrendering his own pack animals for the service of the army, camped at Jacob's Creek and, after one refusal, persuaded his Indians to go forward on the 4th, while Christopher Gist, who had then joined him, also started on a reconnaissance with a small party of Indians and mounted Virginians. On the 6th these detachments returned and reported that all was quiet in the front and that the fort did not appear to have been heavily reinforced. On the 7th Braddock was joined by a convoy of provisions and resumed his advance, camping that night at


¹Compare the estimate of him given by Winthrop Sargent in his *History of an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne in 1755 under Major-General Edward Braddock*, pp. 112-115, and 254.

²Letter to John A. Washington, dated Youghiogany, 28 June, 1755. The quotation is given by *Sparks*, II, pp. 82-83.

³Brady, p. 218.

⁴The rear-guard under Colonel Dunbar did not start to follow the army until July 2nd.

BRADDOCK'S METHOD OF ENCAMPMENT.





*The rear-guard under Colonel Dunbar did not start on July 2nd.

Little Turtle Creek on the bank of the Monongahela. This he intended to cross and to push straight for Fort Duquesne. Had he done so he would undoubtedly have captured it, but was prevented by two circumstances. It was reported that he would have to pass through a narrow defile between the river and the mountain, and, moreover, the steep banks of the creek made it impossible for his wagons to cross by the ordinary road. Another report announced that by turning to the left he would find a good ford over the Monongahela and could re-cross five miles farther down. Once over the second ford, he would be within 8 miles of the fort with no intervening obstacle worthy of mention. Deciding upon this latter road, he turned back from Turtle Creek and camped on the evening of July 8th near the first crossing. Here he was joined by Washington¹ who, though very weak, was able to mount a horse.²

At 3 a. m. on July 9th, Sir John Sinclair with the engineers and axemen, went forward to clear the road, followed at sunrise, by Lieutenant-Colonel Gage with 300 men and 2 guns, who were to occupy the lower ford. It was 8 o'clock when the main body waded the Monongahela and it was reported that Gage had secured the farther ford unopposed. It was past noon when the rest of the column reached there and was drawn up preparatory to crossing the river—at this point about 200 yards in width. General Braddock's love of pomp was manifested by the fact that, in obedience to his express orders, the troops were marched across with the precision of dress-parade, the companies in perfect alignment, with colors flying, while drum, fife and bugle woke the echoes of the wilderness with martial strains that could be heard for miles.³ At one o'clock the passage had been effected, the troops halted for their midday meal, and everything seemed plain sailing. Upon re-assembling, the column, preceded by half a dozen friendly Indians and the Virginia light-horse, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Gage's 300 men and two guns, began their advance of 8 miles to the fort.⁴

¹Washington had left Dunbar and his 600 men at Rock Fort, 50 miles in the rear and had travelled in a wagon following the supply train.

²Braddock solemnly prescribed "Dr. James' powders" for Washington, declaring them to be the best in the world for fever.

³"The troops had been ordered to appear as if for dress parade and every man was attired in his best uniform. The burnished arms shone bright as silver in the glistening rays of the noonday sun, as, with colors waving proudly above their heads, and amid inspiring bursts of martial music, the steady files, with disciplined precision, and glittering in scarlet and gold, advanced to their position. In later years, Washington was often heard to say, writes Sparks, that the most beautiful spectacle he had ever beheld was the display of the British troops on that eventful day. Many who were to become famous in another war were there: Gage, who commanded the British forces in America at the time of Bunker Hill; Gates, the victor at Saratoga and vanquished at Camden; Mercer, who fell at Princeton; Morgan, the hero of Cowpens; and George Washington." *E. McK. Elroy, A History of the United States and its People*, Vol. IV, p. 168.

⁴It is stated upon excellent authority that Washington remonstrated against the solid formation of the troops and advised the open order and Indian tactics. This suggestion merely drew from Braddock the contemptuous retort, "What, a provincial colonel teach a British general how to fight!"

On the east bank of the Monongahela the ground sloped gently up to a height of 200 feet a quarter of a mile from the river. The narrow path, little better than a trail, gradually receded from the river and made a detour to avoid a swamp at the base of a broad shallow ravine which it crossed slightly higher up. 150 yards beyond was a second ravine parallel to the first, both intersected almost at right angles by two small but deep depressions lying substantially parallel to the British advance. At 2.30 p. m., Gordon, the engineer, when about to enter the second transverse ravine, espied a man dressed as an Indian but wearing the silver gorget of an officer, running toward him. This man immediately halted and waved his hat, his signal being answered by a blood-curdling war-whoop and a rain of bullets.¹ The English vanguard promptly wheeled

¹This man was the second in command at Fort Duquesne, the young *Chevalier de Beaujeu*, one of those rare and daring spirits to whom the thought of retreat never occurs. In consequence of the information supplied on July 6th by an Indian, supplemented by the reconnaissances of Chevalier de la Perade on the 6th-7th and by the brothers Normanville on the 8th, Contrecoeur was fully aware of the British approach. On the 8th, yielding to the urgings of de Beaujeu and Dumas, he decided to detach a force to meet the British on the march and to ambuscade them if possible at their passage of the Monongahela or at some favorable point close to the river. This task was confided to de Beaujeu who reconnoitered the *terrain* that same day and selected a spot only a short distance from the river. (Compare *Sparks*, II, p. 473.) His force was to consist of 36 French officers and cadets, 72 regulars, 146 Canadians and all the Indians at the fort, but when the plan was broached to the Indians they refused point-blank to go, insisting that the British troops were far too numerous. Early on the morning of the 9th they reiterated their refusal but, succumbing to the persuasive arguments of de Beaujeu—who asked if they would let their “father go alone”—Charles Langlade—the half-breed leader—and a chief later celebrated as Pontiac, 637 finally volunteered. (*Relation depuis le départ des troupes de Québec, jusqu’au 30 du mois de Septembre, 1755*, quoted by Sargent, pp. 411-412.) The attacking force thus numbered only 891 officers and men (*Monsieur Lotbinière à Monsieur le Comte d’Argenson, au camp de Carillon, le 24 octobre, 1755*, quoted by Sargent, pp. 412-413).

The Indians put on their war-paint, de Beaujeu arrayed himself like a savage, open barrels of powder and bullets were placed in front of the gate of the fort, and the French and their allies helped themselves amid wild excitement. At last de Beaujeu and his command set out, his orders being “to lie in ambush in a favorable spot which he had reconnoitered the day before” (*Relation du Combat du 9 Juillet, 1755*, an anonymous account found in the archives of the French War Office and quoted by Sargent, pp. 409-410.) From the very start the Indians proved refractory, 300 going off in another direction and not rejoining until after the British had crossed the river (*Relation de Godefroy, in Shea, Relation diverses sur la bataille de Malanguenulé*).

The delays which de Beaujeu had experienced, coupled with the rapid movement of the British—the sole instance in the entire campaign—“cost him the opportunity of laying an ambush either at the ford or in the gullies and ravines through which Braddock was now on the point of marching” (*Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe*, I, p. 213. Also Sargent, p. 225). “The detachment found itself in presence of the enemy at three leagues from this fort before having been able to reach its position. Monsieur de Beaujeu, finding that his ambush had failed, made up his mind to attack. He did so with so much vigor that the enemies, who were awaiting us in the best order in the world, were astonished by it. * * *” (*Relation du Combat du 9 Juillet, 1755*. Also *Sparks*, II, p. 473).

The encounter between the quartet of ravines described in the text was purely a matter of chance. This effectually disposes of the oft-repeated charge—last made by Woodrow Wilson in his “*Colonies and the Nation*” (published in Harper’s Magazine in 1901) and in his larger work, *A History of the American People*, II, p. 89—that Braddock was the victim of an ambuscade. This is utterly without foundation; there was no ambush. (Compare *Parkman*, I, p. 214.)

into position and delivered several volleys, the guns also opening with canister and grape. De Beaujeu fell dead and the Canadians took flight, crying "*sauve qui peut!*" but Dumas and the Indian leaders succeeded in rallying the others just as the British began to come on with cheers.

Meanwhile Braddock hastened forward with the main column, leaving Sir Peter Halkett with 400 men, including most of the provincials, to guard the baggage. He arrived just as Gage's men broke in a panic, carrying confusion into the ranks of St. Clair's detachment. Whatever wavering the Indians may have showed at the onset vanished when the English vanguard and main-body melted into one.

"Henceforth it was an almost purely Indian fight and of a nature more astonishingly one-sided than had ever occurred in the annals of backwoods warfare. From right and left and front, and from an enemy that was practically invisible, a deadly fire that scarcely tested the well-known accuracy of the men behind the rifles was poured for two hours into bewildered, huddling groups of redcoats. It was a butchery rather than a battle."¹

The Indians filled the transverse ravines, took shelter behind the trees on the right, whence they slaughtered their victims at will and, extending through the ravines on both flanks, ended by almost completely surrounding the English. Halkett, with the provincials, put up a stiff but hopeless fight. All that mortal men could do was done by Braddock, his officers and Washington, who had two horses shot under him and his uniform riddled with bullets. In the confusion the British guns inadvertently fired on the Virginians, killing fifty, while the infuriated general beat men from behind trees with the flat of his sword in the endeavor to form and keep the line. Braddock's courage was truly magnificent; he was riding his fifth horse and had reluctantly given the order to retreat when he fell with a bullet in his lung.² The retreat quickly degenerated into a rout despite the heroic efforts of Washington, then the ranking officer still unwounded.

"Everything was abandoned to the enemy—wagons, guns, cattle, horses, baggage and £25,000 in specie, while scores of helpless wounded were left victims to the tomahawk and scalping knife. The long strain once loosened, it became a race for life by every man who could drag his legs behind him. Regulars and provincials splashed in panic and

¹Bradley, pp. 98–99.

²It was alleged that Braddock was shot by Thomas Fawcett after driving the latter's brother into the open with the flat of his sword. The evidence in support of this version must, however, be taken *cum grano salis*. Sparks evidently considered it a "cock and bull" story inasmuch as he merely alludes to it (II, p. 475) without troubling himself to refute it. Sargent, on the other hand, devotes nearly nine pages (pp. 244–253) to this "generally accepted tradition" which he dismisses as quite unworthy of credence. (*Vide also Hist. Mag.*, XI, p. 141). The later writers have not adduced any evidence of sufficient weight to prove the soundness of Fawcett's questionable claim to glory.

dire confusion through the ford they had crossed in such pomp but three hours before. Arms and accoutrements were flung away in the terror with which men fled from those ghastly shambles. A few Indians followed the fugitives into the water, but none crossed it. There was no pursuit; with such a wealth of spoil and scalps on the battlefield, it would not have been Indian tactics."³

When Braddock received his wound, he piteously begged to be left to die on the field where he had performed such prodigies of valor, but in vain. He was lifted onto a tumbrel but that was quickly abandoned and the dying general was carried across the river in an officer's silk sash. There he was mounted on a horse but a short distance farther on his pain became unbearable and he had to be dismounted. Beyond the first, and again beyond the second, ford he tried to stem the stampede, but to no avail. Washington was despatched to Dunbar's camp, 60 miles away, to hurry reinforcements and provisions for the wounded, but the foremost fugitives followed hot on his heels and spread such consternation that many of Dunbar's provincials deserted without more ado. Braddock was borne on a litter by two men whom he had to bribe with a guinea and a bottle of wine. On July 11th he reached Dunbar's camp and on Sunday, the 13th, about 8 p. m. he died. They buried him in the gray of the morning in the road just one mile from Fort Necessity and Washington read the service. Wagons were drawn over his grave and troops marched over it lest the Indians should recognize his last resting place and desecrate his remains.

Thus ended the second attempt to wrest the valley of the Ohio from the French. Never before had such a crushing defeat been inflicted upon British arms. Out of 89 officers, 63 were killed or wounded. Of 1,371 rank and file, only 583 survived² and many were tortured to death. The French numbered only 108 officers and men; the Canadians who, as has been seen, fled early in the fight, 146; and the Indians 637, their total loss in killed and wounded being less than fifty.³

"The effect of this battle, which neither before or since has had any exact parallel in British history, was prodigious. Shame and humiliation was (*sic*) felt in England, unbounded exultation in France, while the American colonists' faith in the invincibility of British soldiers was permanently shaken."⁴

It would be difficult to find a better instance of how near one may come to success and yet fail ignominiously. Fort Duquesne was a stoutly built affair of logs, impregnable to musketry, but commanded


²Bradley, pp. 101-102.

²Sargent, pp. 237-238. Mackellar, the engineer, estimated that only 459 came off unharmed.

³Three French officers killed and 4 wounded; 4 regulars wounded; 5 Canandians wounded; 27 Canadian Indians killed and wounded. Total 43. The casualties among the western tribes were not reported.—*Liste des Officiers, Soldats, Miliciens, et Sauvages de Canada qui ont été tués et blessés le 9 Juillet, 1755.*

⁴Bradley, p. 104.

BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT, JULY 9th, 1755.



- French and Canadians.
- Indians.
- English

by the environing hills and would have been quite untenable against Braddock's artillery. Contrecoeur had decided to abandon it and was making preparations for a retreat when the English approached. As a matter of fact he waited all afternoon with feverish anxiety for news of de Beaujeu, whom the cowardly Canadians reported as in dire straits, and it was evening before he learned of the overwhelming victory gained by less than half of his forces. Had Braddock pushed straight for the fort on July 7th he would have captured it out of hand, but his failure illustrates only too well the truth of Lord Brougham's motto:

"Lose not the opportunity; by the forelock take
That subtle power of never-halting Time,
Lest the mere moment's putting off may make
Mischance almost as grave as crime."

IV. THE FINAL SUCCESS: GENERAL FORBES EXPEDITION, 1758.

Braddock's defeat left the American colonies defenseless and was the signal for prolonged Indian atrocities too horrible to mention, while the capture of his papers laid bare the British secret plans and thus enabled the French to frustrate them. On October 5th, 1757, William Pitt was at the helm of Britain and failure was transformed into achievement, his determination being to drive France from the western hemisphere and to leave her crushed both there and in Europe. His first stroke was the capture of Louisbourg by Lord Amherst and General Wolfe; the second, sent against Ticonderoga, culminated in disaster, for Montcalm with barely 3,600 men inflicted a most crushing defeat on General Abercrombie with 6,300 British regulars and 9,000 provincial troops;² the third was directed against the valley of the Ohio. For the last expedition he selected Brigadier General John Forbes and, after much difficulty, this officer assembled at Fort Cumberland, Maryland, and Raystown (now Bedford), Pennsylvania, a force comprised of

62nd Highlanders (Montgomery).....	1,260
Battalion of Royal Americans (60th) (Henry Bouquet)....	363
Two Virginia regiments under Washington.....	1,400
Pennsylvania militia.....	2,500
Maryland militia.....	270
Various detachments.....	180
Total.....	5,973

Of these troops 1,623 were regulars and 4,350 provincials.

¹The principal authorities, in addition to those already cited in the footnotes, are Sparks, Writings of Washington, I, pp. 61-70, II, pp. 68-93, and Appendix IV, pp. 468-476; Journal of Captain Robert Orme, one of General Braddock's aides-de-camp (British Museum, King's Mss., No. 212), quoted by Sargent, pp. 281-357; Journal of the proceedings of the Seamen (a detachment), ordered by Commodore Keppel to assist on a late expedition to the Ohio * * *, quoted by Sargent, pp. 366-389; Appendices to Sargent; Parkman, and the original sources given by him in Montcalm and Wolfe, II, pp. 162-233; Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America, V, pp. 495-501.

²Bradley, pp. 234-257.

Notwithstanding Washington's vigorous protests, Forbes, influenced by some Pennsylvania land speculators, resolved to construct a military road north of the route used by Braddock and to guard it with a line of small forts which would serve as depots and rallying points. Colonel Bouquet was sent forward at the end of July to superintend this work, his camp being at Loyalhannon, 40 miles west of Raystown and about 30 from Fort Duquesne. There he was joined by Washington with Colonel Byrd, Major Lewis and the Virginians. As the torrential rains had well-nigh destroyed the labors of the road-builders, travel had to be suspended indefinitely unless the road were to be cut to pieces. As the French Indians were becoming troublesome and aggressive, Major Grant persuaded Bouquet to permit him to reconnoitre Fort Duquesne with 813 troops—600 Highlanders and Royal Americans and two of Washington's companies. Starting early in September, Grant reached the ridge overlooking the fort after nightfall on the 13th. The friendly Indians reported the garrison equal to the attacking force but Grant, ignorant that de Ligneris had been reinforced to about 1,200 men, exclusive of the Indians camped about the fort, imagined that there were only a paltry 500 or 600. Accordingly at 2 a. m. on September 14th, Lewis, with a detachment of Virginians and Highlanders, was ordered to attack the Indians in the plain and to retreat so as to draw them into an ambush where Grant and the rest would be waiting. Lewis blundered, lost his way and after wandering about aimlessly in the darkness rejoined the column at dawn, having achieved nothing. Grant, stung with rage, imagined in his ignorance of the proper methods of wilderness fighting, that he could capture the fort with his Highlanders, but he committed the blunder of leaving Lewis with the Virginians, his only experienced Indian fighters, to guard the baggage until the battle was joined. At 7 a. m. that damp, foggy morning Grant began his forward movement and by way of warning the enemy, who appear from some inexplicable reason to have been ignorant of his proximity, he proceeded to direct his drummers and buglers to play the *reveille*. The French and Indians responded with a vengeance, swarmed down on the hapless attackers, surrounded the Highlanders, separated them from Lewis and Bullitt and began a slaughter similar to that which they had inflicted on Braddock. The Highlanders broke in a panic, but Bullitt by heroic efforts held his troops in hand, and when the enemy appeared there ensued one of the hottest little engagements ever fought in Pennsylvania. The pursuit was effectually checked and an unhampered retreat made to Loyalhannon. This foolish expedition cost 273 killed and wounded and a few captured; Bullitt alone came out with honor and was complimented and promoted by Forbes.

Shortly after this rout, General Forbes, whose illness had kept him at Raystown, joined the advance. A council of war favored postponing any further attempt until next year, but Forbes was made of such stuff that he saw fit to disregard the advice of Washington and Bouquet and on November 18th pressed forward with 2,500 men stripped of all possible *impedimenta* and even without tents. In five days they covered 50 miles. News was received that de Ligneris, fondly imagining that Grant's defeat and the lateness of the season would force the British to give over the attempt, had materially reduced his garrison and the French Indians, unable to procure food and realizing that the lilies of France were rapidly drooping, had been won over by Forbes' emissary, a Moravian missionary named Post. On November 24th the advanced column camped 12 miles from Fort Duquesne and was at a loss to account for the dull reverberations of distant explosions which fell upon their ears. Next morning the march was resumed in three parallel columns; that on the right commanded by Washington, the centre by Forbes, still borne, like Marshal Saxe at Fontenoy, on his litter,¹ and the left by Bouquet. Soon Washington, from his knowledge and experience of the *terrain* was placed in the lead. As the daylight was deepening into twilight they reached the ridge overlooking the clearing where Grant had been routed but, instead of the bastions of Fort Duquesne with the standard of France proudly flaunting defiance, their eyes fell upon naught but blackened and smouldering ruins. The French, surprised by their rapidity and realizing that no prolonged defense were possible, had thrown their guns into the river, blown up the work and fled the night before. The valley of the Ohio was won at last.²

General Forbes, who was dying of intestinal inflammation, was carried with as much care as possible to Philadelphia, arriving on January 14th, 1759, amid the ringing of bells and firing of cannon. On the 11th of

¹"The Indians had noticed and derided a commander who had to be carried on a litter, and to counteract their impression "it was given out by the English that the British chief had a temper so impetuous, irascible and combative, that it was not thought safe to trust him at large even among his own people, but that the practice was to *let him out on the eve of battle!*"—*Brady*, p. 255.

²The principal authorities for the Forbes expedition are Sparks, Writings of Washington, I, pp. 90-101, II, pp. 288-322; Official correspondence of General Forbes in the British Record Office; Bouquet and Haldimand Papers in the British Museum; Archives and Colonial Records of Pennsylvania; Official correspondence of de Ligneris and Vaudreuil; Letter from a British Officer in the Expedition published in the Gentleman's Magazine, XXIX; Grant's report to Forbes; Journal of Christian Frederic Post published in *Ye Olden Time*, vol. I; List of Killed, Wounded and Missing in the Action of September 14, 1758; Hazard's Pennsylvania Register, VIII, p. 141; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, II, pp. 131-163; Sargent, History of Braddock's Expedition, pp. 270-275; Bradley, The Fight with France for North America, pp. 268-287; Brady, Colonial Fights and Fighters, pp. 243-260; Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America, V, pp. 528-530.


March he died and was buried in the chancel of Christ Church, where a tablet, erected by the Society of Colonial Wars, bears this inscription:

“By a steady pursuit of well-conducted measures, in defiance of disease and numberless obstructions, he brought to a happy issue a most extraordinary campaign, resulting in the evacuation of Fort Du Quesne, and made a willing sacrifice of his own life to what he loved more, the interest of King and Country.”

V. THE INFLUENCE ON MODERN TACTICS OF LESSONS LEARNED IN COLONIAL MILITARY OPERATIONS.

In my previous address delivered on February 12th the endeavor was made to give a brief but adequate comprehension of the operations which took place during the sieges of Louisbourg in 1745 and 1758. The former, as has been remarked, was one of the most astounding feats in the annals of war, excelled perhaps only by Caesar's capture of Alesia, the more so since one of the mightiest fortifications ever erected capitulated after only six weeks of siege to a motley band of New England farmers and fisherman led by a lumber merchant. The moral effect of this extraordinary achievement on the part of the American colonists was infinitely more far-reaching than at first blush would appear. Of the men who fought at Bunker Hill many had been at Louisbourg and when they saw the mud walls that General Gage had constructed on Boston Neck and compared them to the mighty ramparts of the French fortress which they had so gallantly captured, they laughed them to scorn. The annihilation of Braddock at Fort Duquesne was, *mirabile dictu*, a blessing in disguise for the colonists insomuch as it shook the prevalent belief in the invincibility of British troops, bred in them a contempt—by no means wholly warranted—for the European method of fighting in close formation, and compelled them, *nolens volens*, to rely entirely upon their own power of fighting instead of trusting supinely to the protecting *aegis* of England as they otherwise would unquestionably have done. Indeed it would be difficult to lay too much stress upon the influence of these factors in strengthening the *morale* of the American colonists and in confirming them in the belief that they could make a successful opposition to the regulars of Great Britain.

Three times in their history the Americans have taught the world some valuable lessons in war. During the Colonial struggles was demonstrated the superiority of good marksmen in open order—each one taking advantage of the accidents of the ground—over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow. In the War of 1812 the American ships established incontestably the merit of their method of firing on the downward roll by inflicting far greater damage on their adversaries than



Washington's route in 1754 Braddock's route in 1755 Forbes' route in 1758 — + — + — +

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they received from the British, who fired on the upward roll. In the War of the Rebellion the Americans showed what was to be the future rôle of cavalry which moved in the saddle and fought on foot; what successive thin lines of attack could accomplish; what was the superiority of armored over unarmored ships; and their inventions paved the way for the rapid fire of today, both of large and small arms.

In his *critique* of the campaigns of the world's greatest commanders, Napoleon declared that Caesar invariably sought "to give himself all the chances possible to insure his victory on the field of battle."¹ In all ages success has attended that general who has most nearly attained this *desideratum*, although the *modus operandi* has naturally varied with changing conditions and with the means at the disposal of each leader. In modern times it was the North American Indians who taught men the effect of deadly marksmanship, of fighting in open order and of profiting by such cover as the *terrain* affords. From them the colonists learned their lesson and the example set by the latter during the French and Indian wars and in the Revolution eventually permeated the entire military world. To be sure, as early as the first introduction of fire-arms there had been fighting in open order, but at the beginning of the XVIIIth century this method was used in Europe only by irregular foot composed of brave, though for the most part irresponsible, men. The first great general to systematize this method was Frederick the Great, who, quick to profit by the experience of Europeans troop in America, developed the flexibility of his army far beyond that of his adversaries and by concentrating his attacks, which were made in line and usually in oblique order, he emerged from his tremendous struggle with a military renown unrivalled in his generation.² Historically speaking, the line formation in varying aspects is almost as old as fighting of which there exists any authoritative record,³ but from time to time this method has been forgotten, modified or subordinated to the use of troops *en masse*. The reason is not far to seek, for whenever troops are deficient in initiative, cohesion and that resultant confidence which training alone can produce, or when their strength is numerically insufficient for the operation contemplated, heavier and more compact masses than the line must be employed in order to give the requisite weight and solidity for successful attack or defense.

¹"Notes sur l'Art de la Guerre." Correspondence de Napoléon, XXXI, pp. 353-354.

²General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, *The Operations of War*, p. 340.

³The oblique order, over which Europe went mad until Austerlitz dealt its death blow, is as old as the battle of the Granicus fought by Alexander the Great against the Persians, B. C. 334. It was used by Cyrus at the battle of Thymbrus, by the Gauls and Belgians at the Sambre against Caesar, by Turenne at the battle of the Downs, by Marshal Luxembourg at Fleurus, by Marlborough at Höchstädt, by Prince Eugene at Ramillies and Turin, and by Charles XII at Pultawa. *Vide Huidekoper, Military Studies*, p. 101.

Braddock's annihilation dealt the knell of the close formation so universally used in the battle tactics prior to that time, but, even so, it died a very lingering death, especially among the British. There was one conspicuous exception, however, and a notable instance of the value of knowing history thoroughly and of applying the lessons of the past to the problems of the day was afforded at the second siege of Louisbourg in 1758, when

"Wolfe had a large corps of light infantry, picked for their marksmanship from various regiments, and trained, so far as a week or two at Halifax could train them, in tactics that became familiar enough later on, but were regarded at the time as quite a strange innovation on the part of the vigorous and eccentric brigadier. It was merely a matter of advancing in loose formation, and using all the inequalities of the ground for protection, coupled with a light and easy costume for the men, namely, a short jacket, small round hat, and a kind of light woollen trouser, cut moderately tight. A story goes that an officer who was regarded as somewhat learned among his fellows remarked to Wolfe that his new corps reminded him of the *καρδουχοι* alluded to by Xenophon. "That is exactly where I got the idea," replied Wolfe. "only these people never read anything, and consequently believe the idea to be a novel one." "¹

The lessons which should have been taught by Braddock's *débauch* and Wolfe's success were apparently wasted on British commanders until the advent of Wellington. Their persistent use of close formation during the Revolutionary War was punished—as it deserved to be—by innumerable defeats mainly attributable to their clinging to a system which could not prevail against troops in open order, even when almost devoid—as were the Americans—of that cohesion which discipline alone can give. Notwithstanding this long series of failures and in the face of the repeated victories in Spain won by the forces of the Iron Duke when formed in line, General Packenham had the temerity to marshal the flower of the Peninsular veterans in close columns of attack at the battle of New Orleans, with the result that they were hopelessly beaten by a motley force, as deficient in discipline as it was deadly in marksmanship, which fought behind the trenches under General Jackson. The British persistency in adhering to serried ranks after so many disasters would merit little else but condemnation were it not for one unsurmountable fact, namely, that the Indian method of fighting demanded men of special training, exceptional hardiness and extraordinary qualifications. Even the average colonist was no match for the redskin

¹Bradley, p. 223.

²The battle of the Great Kennawha, fought on October 10th, 1774, by about 700 thousand picked borderers under General Lewis against about 900 Shawnees under Cornstalk, was the first occasion when a body of Americans had defeated an Indian force of like strength in a pitched battle.

and obviously such a standard was immeasurably beyond what soldiers trained to European warfare alone could possibly hope to attain.

The successes of Frederick the Great caused a slavish imitation of his method of forming troops in line, but within a few years of his death his system was destined to be superseded by another modeled largely upon that of the Indians. The French governors had discovered that by comparison with the Canadian regular, trained to backwoods fighting, the regular sent from France, was deficient to a marked degree,¹ and the superiority of the American style of warfare impressed itself strongly upon Lafayette, Rochambeau and the officers who served under them in the Revolution. Upon their return to France was initiated a movement in opposition to the blind adherence to the Prussian system, which, however, prevailed until 1791,² but two years later tactics based on the lessons learned in America were introduced into the French armies. So successfully did the untrained levies composing them operate against the Allied armies that the Prussian method received a blow from which it never recovered, and the regulations of 1795 put a definite end to the claims of its adherents. It was thus that there arose in France, as well as in all European nations, an organization of light infantry trained to fight in open order and its success prompted a similar training for the infantry of the line. When men fight as the North American Indian fought, it is obvious that the minimum amount of impedimenta must be carried. This system suited perfectly the levies of the French Revolutionary armies who were burning with a desire to "do the impossible." Moreover, a depleted exchequer and the dearth of equipment rendered it impossible to furnish them with the ponderous supply-trains and magazines upon which other troops were so largely dependent. These factors gave the French a mobility vastly superior to that of any other soldiers and, furthermore, a threat directed against their line of communications produced no such effect as in the case of other European armies. If their camps were captured there was virtually nothing to seize, for the troops literally lived on the country or starved.

These facts have been strongly emphasized because Napoleon inherited from the French Revolution a system which he developed, *pari passu*

¹The Marquis de Vaudreuil considered that one Canadian was worth three soldiers sent from old France. *Bradley*, p. 166.

²Since a succession of English victories had demonstrated that the French possessed no such power of resistance on the defensive as the Anglo-Saxon, a system of heavy columns destined to supply the necessary weight and mass was devised at the beginning of the XVIIIth century by Folard. After his death a long discussion as to the relative merits of the column and the line ensued between his disciple, General Mesnil-Durand, and the Comte de Guibert, a vigorous supporter of the Prussian school. The glamor of Frederick's victories proved irresistible and the policy advocated by de Guibert thus remained the controlling factor in the organization of the French armies until 1791.

with his own ideas, to such a point that his *dictum* is accepted as final. His astounding marches and manœuvres could never have been made with troops hampered with heavy baggage and cumbersome supply-trains. The dearth of subsistence is not infrequently a weapon of greatest advantage in the hands of an able commander. His men know that the country behind them has been devastated and that food can only be obtained by a forward movement. No general has ever lived who understood better how to utilize this stimulus than did Napoleon and the almost superhuman driving power which he exerted upon his troops is directly traceable to his ability.¹ Austerlitz, the most decisive victory of modern times, demonstrated anew the tactical value of good marksmanship, of fighting in open order and of profiting by such cover as the *terrain* affords. Not only in the Napoleonic armies but in those of today the close observer can discover much that was characteristic of the method of fighting employed by the North American Indian.

The lessons learned in America have for the most part given rise to progress in the organization and offensive power of troops. On the other hand, one phase has produced a national belief which may yet prove fatal to the United States. Just because the American soldier of the Colonies and the Revolution was superior to the soldier trained in the pedantic method then prevalent in England and France, it does not follow by any means that the same is true today. The American soldier of that time was an extraordinary marksman, a man of great physical endurance, daring and self reliance, able to take care of himself under all conditions. The same traits were characteristic of the frontiersmen for decades after the Revolution. The secret of their success was due to the training they received in constant fighting with the wildest of foes. Today these conditions have passed and the type of man who brought success to British arms in the days of the colonies, to American arms in the Revolution, no longer exists. The best training for war is not now to be found among the Americans but in other nations. The wars of the present are too short and too decisive to admit of adequate preparation after the outbreak of hostilities, and it is the endeavor of every well-prepared nation to strike its hardest blows at the outset. The average American is utterly oblivious to the fact that we have never yet been pitted against the full strength of a first-class military power. The criminal waste of life and treasure which have characterized every war in which the United

¹For more than a century the prevalent impression has been that Napoleon's system of supply was beyond criticism. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In active campaign the troops lived on the country either by requisitions or by plundering with the connivance of their officers. Even the Army of Austerlitz, probably the greatest army of all times, was woefully deficient in the organization and operation of its commissariat. *Vide Huidekoper, Napoleon's Concentration on the Rhine and Main in 1805.* From original documents in the French War Office. Journal of the Military Service Institution for September-October, 1907, pp. 207-220.

States has been engaged and the fact that we have had to use at least two and a half men to every one opponent¹ have been concealed with the most studious care by our historians whose course in this respect cannot be too strongly censured. It would therefore be difficult to conceive of a more preposterous doctrine or a belief more utterly unfounded than that which prevails in this country at the present time, namely: that to produce a good soldier it is only necessary to put a uniform on a man and a gun in his hand.

Times change and wise men change with them. The pride, bigotry, conceit and refusal of the British commander at Fort Duquesne to adapt himself to conditions merely because they were unlike any he had ever encountered have made his name a by-word in history. It accordingly behooves us Americans to profit by his example, to see to it that our military forces are proportioned in numbers to the rôle that the United States has undertaken to play as a world-power and that they are trained to the highest standard set by other nations, lest we too suffer defeat not less disastrous and ignominious than Braddock.

¹Huidekoper, Is the United States prepared for War? North American Review for February and March, 1906, and republished in pamphlet form (May, 1907) with an introduction by Hon. William H. Taft.

ERRATA.

Page 27, footnote 1, beginning of line 3. For I, pp. 6-51, read II, pp. 6-51.

Page 37, line 23. For Europeans troop read European troops.

Page 37, footnote 1. For Correspondence read Correspondance.

Page 38, line 18. For καρδουχοι read καρδοδχοι.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF COLONIAL WARS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ORGANIZED MAY 20, 1893.

Register of the Society. 1897. With portrait of Richard Worsam Meade, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. pp. 124.

Register of the Society. 1904. With frontispiece of badge of the Society of Colonial Wars, portrait of Francis Asbury Roe, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., First Governor of the Society, and other officers. Twenty-two portraits. pp. 214.

MEMORIAL PAPERS.

No. 1. George Brown Goode. By A. Howard Clark. With portrait. pp. 8. 1896.

No. 2. Charles Frederick Tiffany Beale. By Marcus Benjamin. With portrait. pp. 13. 1902.

No. 3. William Herman Wilhelm, Captain, U. S. A. By Ethan Allen Weaver. With portrait. pp. 9. 1902.

No. 4. Francis Asbury Roe, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. By Marcus Benjamin. With portrait and eight other illustrations. pp. 35. 1903.

No. 5. Gilbert Thompson. By Marcus Benjamin. With portrait. pp. 18. 1910.

No. 6. Frederic Wolters Huidekoper. By Frederic Louis Huidekoper. With portrait, chronology, notices and resolutions. pp. 42. 1910.

HISTORICAL PAPERS.

No. 1. The Colonial Boundaries of Virginia and Maryland. By Gilbert Thompson. With map. pp. 8. 1899.

No. 2. An American Sea Captain of Colonial Times. By Francis Asbury Roe, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. pp. 11. 1900.

No. 3. Historical Military Powder-horns. By Gilbert Thompson. With eleven illustrations. pp. 16. 1901.

No. 4. Historical Address at Dedication of the Braddock Boulder, November 10, 1907. By Marcus Benjamin. With four illustrations. pp. 16. 1908.

No. 5. Colonel Joseph Belt. By Caleb Clarke Magruder, Jr. With Patent and illustration of "Chevy Chase" manor-house. pp. 36. 1909.

No. 6. Historical Address at Dedication of the Colonel Ninian Beall Boulder, October 30, 1910. By Caleb Clarke Magruder, Jr. With six illustrations, Grant for "Bacon Hall," Patent for "Rock of Dunbarton," Deed of Gift to Patuxent (Md.) Congregation, and Colonel Beall's Will. pp. 44. 1911.

No. 7. Twentieth Anniversary of the Organization of the Society of Colonial Wars in the District of Columbia. By Caleb Clarge Magruder, Jr. In preparation.

No. 8. Some Important Colonial Military Operations. By Frederic Louis Huidekoper. With 2 maps, 4 plans and a View of Louisbourg in 1731. pp. 41. 1914.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Address of Welcome, by his Excellency, Governor Francis A. Roe, U. S. N., at first dinner of the Society, December 19, 1893. pp. 8.

Preliminary draft of a Constitution, printed upon half-sheets and sent to members for suggestions. pp. 18. November, 1894.

The preceding was adopted and printed in February, 1895. A circular of four pages, with preamble and qualifications for membership, was printed, 1895; also, a similar circular, giving list of members, was printed January, 1896.

A list of membership is published annually as a circular. pp. 4.

The Year Book and Register of the Society, 1897, contains the Constitution and By-Laws as amended to that date.

Preliminary draft of Constitution, printed and sent to members for suggestions. With cover. pp. 17. April, 1902.

The preceding was adopted without change, May 13, 1902, and printed, with embossed seal of the Society on the cover. pp. 16.

First Service, Sunday, February 12, 1905. St. John's Church, Georgetown D. C. (With embossed seal.) pp. 12.

- Second Annual Service, Sunday, February 18, 1906. St. John's Church, Washington. (With embossed seal.) pp. 12.
- Third Annual Service, Sunday, February 17, 1907. Epiphany Church, Washington. (Without seal.) pp. 12.
- Dedication service, Sunday, November 10, 1907. Cathedral Grounds, D. C. One illustration of the Braddock tablet and boulder. pp. 12.
- Fourth Annual Church Service, Sunday, April 26, 1908. Christ Church, Georgetown, D. C. (Without seal.) pp. 8.
- Fifth Annual Church Service, Sunday, May 2, 1909. St. John's Church, Washington. (Without seal.) pp. 9.
- Sixth Annual Church Service, Sunday, May 8, 1910. St. John's Church, Washington. (Without seal.) pp. 9.
- Dedication Service, Sunday, October 30, 1910. Colonel Ninian Beall memorial. St. John's Church, Georgetown, D. C. With illustration of tablet and boulder. p. 10.
- Seventh Annual Church Service, Sunday, May 21, 1911. Church of the Covenant, Washington. (Without seal.) pp. 9.
- Dedication Service, Sunday, November 12, 1911. Colonel Joseph Belt memorial. All Saints Church, Chevy Chase, Md. With illustration of tablet and boulder. p. 12.
- Eighth Annual Church Service, Sunday, November 10, 1912. Bethlehem Chapel, Washington Cathedral, Georgetown, D. C. (Without seal.) pp. 9.
- Ninth Annual Church Service, Sunday, February 1, 1914. New York Avenue Presbyterian Church, Washington. (Without seal.) pp. 9.

CALEB CLARKE MAGRUDER, Jr.,

Historian.

May 20th, 1914.

